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In 1986, the Zhoushan-based artist Wu Shanzhuan worked with other recent art school 
graduates to create an installation called ‘Red Humour’ (hongse youmo ????). It 
featured a room covered in the graffiti-like remnants of big-character posters (dazi bao ?
??) that recalled the Cultural Revolution when hand-written posters replete with vitriol 
and denunciations of the enemies of Mao Zedong Thought were one of the main cultural 
weapons in the hands of revolutionary radicals (Figure 1). It was an ironic attempt to 
recapture the overwhelming and manic mood engendered by the red sea of big-character 
posters that swelled up in Beijing from mid 1966 and developed into a movement to ‘paint 
the nation red’ with word-images during the second half of that year and in 1967. In the 
reduced and concentrated form of an art installation Wu attempted to replicate the stifling 
environment of the written logorrhoea of High-Maoist China (Figure 2).  
 
 
Figure 1: ‘Red Humor,’ Wu Shanzhuan. Source: Gao Minglu (2008) ’85 Meishu Yundong—80 niandaide 
renwen qianwei, Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, Guilin, vol. 1. 
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Figure 2: Red Sea, Beijing 1967. Source: Long Bow Archive, Boston. 
 
As an irony-laden reprise of big-character poster culture, Wu Shanzhuan’s ‘Red Humor’ 
could only convey an overall and absurdist sense of the big-character posters that played 
such a crucial role in the culture and politics of China’s Cultural Revolution era (c. 1964–
1978). In the bapo ?? (‘eight fragments’ bricolage of the late-Qing era) style of his 
installation (Figure 3), a simple quotation of verbal extremism and abuse, Wu Shanzhuan 
offered a momentary reflection on the word, image, the wall and the maelstrom of the 
revolutionary excess and verbal outpourings of the period. But in so doing he also reduced 
what was a complex and unique medium—one that allowed for the articulation of vastly 
different views and rhetorical effects—to something akin to cultural wallpaper. Since the 
1980s, Wu has had many emulators and ‘avant-garde successors.’ Reconsiderations and 
manipulations of the word in the logocentric political culture of China respond to the 
abiding power of the written and the formulaic (tifa ??) in that environment, and they 
feed off the allure of dissent and the opportunities provided by the art market to reaffirm 
the aura of that which they would challenge. 
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Figure 3: Eight-fragments Art. Source: Nancy Berliner,  
‘The Eight Brokens, Chinese Trompe l’Oeil Painting,’ Orientations, February 1992. 
 
This essay considers the legacies of the word made image in China, legacies in which 
metaphor and the written Chinese character zi ?, caricature and politics, text and subtext 
are engaged in a constant and complex exchange.  
 
*     *     * 
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Characters are the paintings of the heart ???? 
—Yang Xiong, Western Han dynasty ???? 
 
The person is reflected in his compositions ???? 
The person is reflected in his calligraphy ???? 
The person is reflected in his painting ???? 
 
Remembering the Xinhai year of 1911 
The year 2011 marked the anniversary of the formal start of China’s century of revolution. 
It was, and remains, a revolutionary era in terms of politics, society and culture. The 
discussion of Xinhai, revolution and reform are not merely matters of interest to nit-
picking historians or contemporary commentators on the historical parallels between a 
dynastic system in decay and the hide-bound one-party state of China today. As Chinese 
historians and thinkers in disparate intellectual camps have noted, trends to affirm 
revolutionary tradition, failed (or foreshortened) radicalism, as well as nostalgia for social 
hierarchy, re-imagined Chinese values, along with political positions at various points on 
the spectrum from social democracy to radical neo-liberalism continue to inform and 
enliven debates in China (Xiao 2012). These debates are vital today, as they were in the 
Xinhai decade—that period from the New Policies of the Qing to the New Culture 
Movement, and again during various eras since then. For behind China’s search for wealth 
and power has always lurked a more existential quest, one that enlivens the realm of ideas 
and art in complex and contradictory ways: the search for meaning and ways to express 
that search—be it through the written, or visual, or in the overlapping nexus of the two. 
 
For the Chinese world, the past is not a foreign country; many of the major issues related 
to ideas and culture, thought and history remain on the agenda of political and social 
change today. The issues at the heart of China’s revolutionary century—social justice, 
political participation, basic freedoms, material welfare, national strength—have valence 
far beyond the country’s borders. In an era of a global China, one in which economics and 
trade, political behaviour and cultural ambition now enjoy an embracing reach, the 
continued discussion and understanding of historical moments in that country’s modern 
era are relevant in new ways. 
 
Even in the late-nineteenth century the Chinese character and the written language were 
finding their way into art, albeit commercial Treaty Port art. The most noteworthy genre 
was that of ‘Eight Fragments’ (bapo ??) art. These works were produced by anonymous 
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artists (Figure 4). They feature texts—including Chinese characters and Manchu, 
epigraphy and calligraphy—in a strewn, cut-up constellation. Generally framed as 
traditional Chinese scholar-artists scrolls, they are a particular form of early modern or 
late-traditional art. Eight Fragments art appeared in the latter decades of China’s last 
imperial dynasty, from roughly the 1870s. As the art historian and bapo expert Nancy 
Berliner has said of this kind of Sino-bricolage avant la lettre, such works were made as 
paintings as well as being featured as designs on porcelain and various objects (Berliner 
1992: 61, 62, 63). The creation of that liminal world, one that existed between the Chinese 
literary hinterland and the Treaty Ports that saw the creation of bapo works was centred 
on the entrepôt of Shanghai. They reflect also the fractured written world of China’s late 
tradition through artistic reinvention.  
 
 
Figure 4: Eight-fragments Art. Source: Nancy Berliner, ‘The Eight Brokens, Chinese Trompe l’Oeil 
Painting,’ Orientations, February 1992. 
 
Bapo works were produced with greater frequency in the declining years of the Qing 
dynasty in the late-nineteenth century and then following the 1911 Xinhai Revolution. In a 
world in which canonical texts—the Confucian classics that had defined the Chinese 
world, political power, social elites and the cultural landscape for over a millennium—
were in tatters, these works reflected the riven reality of their times. 
 
When an earlier version of this paper was presented at the conference ‘Word & Image, 
East & West,’ our venue was at the Art Gallery of New South Wales, Sydney Australia. 
At the time the gallery was holding an exhibition entitled ‘The Mad Square: Modernity in 
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German Art, 1910–37.’ The show featured one work that also appears in the promotional 
materials for the show by Ludwig Meidner (1884–1966). Begun by the artist in the first 
year of China’s Republic, 1912, Meidner’s ‘Apocalyptic Landscapes’ would later be 
celebrated for their prophetic vision not only of the chaotic modern city but also of 
Germany reduced to rubble in war, one that would visit destruction from the air on the 
cities of that country during the last years of WWII (Figure 5). 
 
The cultural and architectural critic of The Sydney Morning Herald, Elizabeth Farrelly, 
had the following to say of the exhibition: 
 
The Mad Square’s rooms lead you into hell, hold you down and tickle you until your tears curdle into 
laughter … 
 
But The Mad Square is more than that. Much more. It’s about seeing. Really—frankly, fearlessly—
seeing. (Farrelly 2011) (Figure 5) 
 
 
Figure 5: ‘Apocalypse,’ Meidner, 1913. Source: Sydney Morning Herald. 
 
In this centenary year of China’s 1911 Xinhai Revolution, there is another image of 
destructive energy that prefaced my spoken presentation. The Beijing-based Australian-
Chinese artist Guo Jian created a diorama, a large-scale work that he titled ‘Demolition 
and Forced Relocation’ (Chaiqian ??) (Figure 6). He says of the piece that: ??????
?????????????????????????????????????(Demolition and 
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forced relocation is a battle. We have been entertained into fearlessness; there is naught, 
neither straight nor bent. Wanton arrogance is undone by its own machines of 
destruction). 
 
 
Figure 6: ‘Demolition and Relocation,’ Guo Jian, 2011.  
Source: China Heritage Quarterly, September 2011. 
 
I will return to the idea of ‘demolition’—chai ?—a word that in Chinese is 
deconstructive in its very nature. For not only is the character chai scrawled on walls and 
buildings to mark sites destined for demolition; it is also the word used to describe the act 
of making something understood as well as the act of disaggregating a Chinese character, 
either in written or verbal form, and explicating it or reordering it. To chai zi ?? is to 
dismember a character, to reduce it to its component parts, to open it for redeployment, 
reinterpretation and re-imaging, be that as a new word, concept or possibility.  
 
An elite art in the service of politics 
Learning how characters are put together, about their constituent parts, those elements that 
have meaning in and of themselves, those that are pictographic in some real or abstract 
way, or those that have some phonetic significance is a fundamental part of the acquisition 
of an understanding of how Chinese works as a language, a writing system and a world of 
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significance. With that learning—for Chinese and non-Chinese alike—the stroke and 
calligraphic line often play a crucial role (Figure 7). 
 
 
Figure 7: Mao Zedong at his desk. Source: Long Bow Archive, Boston. 
 
Calligraphic work written for private display and the appreciation of connoisseurs has a 
venerable tradition in China (Ledderose 1970; Murck and Fong 1991). For over a century 
street politics saw calligraphy used as a cheap, convenient and popular means for 
communicating slogans, short messages and otherwise banned ideas. Anonymous protest, 
calls to arms, revelations, exhortations and denunciations could all be written up using the 
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traditional brush, ink and paper and posted with facility on walls in cities, towns or even 
villages. These slogans and exhortations could act as a form of public outcry; they were 
posted outside government offices; they could give expression to interrogations on the 
doors of publishers, direct accusations at miscreants, appeal for justice to the courts or the 
police, or just give voice, in written form, to personal grievances.  
 
The political scientist Richard Kraus has noted: ‘The reconstitution of the bond between 
art and politics is encapsulated in the transformation of calligraphy from a private to a 
public art. Calligraphy in the People’s Republic [of China] publicizes relationships that 
were conventionally private by using an art that was traditionally personal’ (1991: 169). 
Kraus goes on to comment on how cultural and political authority were expressed by New 
China’s leaders when they wrote calligraphic inscriptions for newspaper mastheads, or 
institutions such as factories and schools. Part of the reconstitution of calligraphy 
redirected what had been an elitist cultural form into the realm of mass media politics.  
 
Calligraphy would also be central to popular protest. Different from the grand sweep of 
the leader’s brush were the demotic calligraphic works that would feature in Chinese 
politics and life for over four decades: the dazi bao, literally ‘big-character poster.’ The 
dazi bao as a vehicle for informal and irregular popular communication first featured 
prominently during the years of the Japanese War from the late 1930s. Some of the 
earliest dissenting voices within the Communist Party chose wall posters (bibao ??)—
already a common form of agitprop popularized during the Republic—as a means for 
expressing their views. A number of writers and artists at the Communist Party’s wartime 
base in Yan’an, Shaanxi province, posted satirical essays, poems and cartoons on walls. 
They used these artistic, written and literary forms to question the inequalities of the 
proffered life under the party and offered ‘internal’ criticisms of a progressive political 
cause that was spoken of only in positive and laudatory terms by the party media. 
 
The new agitprop tradition of slogan writing, wall-poster notices carrying political 
information, or new directions in mass propaganda created a format—and a calligraphic 
fluency—that could be utilized by people of all social strata for political expression, no 
matter how basic. The act of composing a wall poster, usually with an audience of one’s 
supporters or fellow authors (the poster might often carry a collective message), and then 
posting it either openly or covertly at night, was a new form of publication.  
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The Communist Party Chairman Mao Zedong approved of this form of public political 
expression during the early years of the People’s Republic, which was founded in 1949. 
He would eventually even praise the use of the ‘four greats’ or four big rights (si da ??) 
that gave (prescribed) license to people to speak out, to air their views fully, to hold great 
debates, and to write big-character posters. In the mid–1950s posters reappeared, this time 
on walls in factories, educational institutions and elsewhere during the Hundred Flowers 
campaign when for a time the Communist Party urged disgruntled citizens to air publicly 
their complaints about the status quo. Workers as well as the urban elites used calligraphic 
posters to express themselves. Special woven mats were attached to wooden frameworks 
thrown up as temporary walls and poster alleys in factories, government office 
compounds, schools and universities for the posting of dazibao. They were avidly read 
and ‘broadcast’ by people who acted as individual scribes. They would transmit the 
content of the poster privately or back in their own work place by copying it out and 
posting it anew (Figure 8). 
 
 
Figure 8: Mao Zedong viewing big-character posters in the 1950s.  
Source: Long Bow Archive, Boston. 
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An effective weapon 
The outspokenness of the Hundred Flowers period, and the flurry of big-character posters, 
shocked party rulers, and as a result, 1957 saw a period of repression and silence. For 
nearly a decade, although rogue individuals might dare to air solitary grievances, the 
poster was for the main part only used to extol party policy. But the big-character poster 
would reappear with devastating effect when Mao, sidelined for his more radical 
economic and political policies, encouraged popular protest against the party mainstream 
in the mid–1960s.  
 
During 1965 and the first half of 1966, Mao argued that dangerous reactionaries were in 
control of the country’s direction and the party media. He supported a rebellion against 
the entrenched ruling party of which he was titular head in an attempt to regain 
ideological control of the party and once more dominate state policy. He did so through a 
series of guerrilla-like feints and moves. In particular, he and his supporters saw the ‘four 
greats,’ among them big-character posters as ‘effective weapons’ (you li wuqi ????). 
As many authors have noted, posters written by anonymous authors or put up overnight in 
prominent places for mass delectation were a kind of propaganda tool that effectively by-
passed the traditional party-controlled media at a time of intense political infighting and 
contestation. Furthermore, through the act of copying, reproduction and dissemination 
these posters acquired a unique mystique. Li Rui, a secretary of Mao’s for a short period 
in the 1950s, quoted the Chairman as having remarked: ‘Many things cannot be resolved 
by laws alone. Laws are a dead letter, no one is intimidated by them. But up goes a big-
character poster, the masses carry out a denunciation followed by a struggle meeting, and 
that’s more effective than any law’ (Li Rui 1998: 290). 
 
On 25 May 1966, a number of student and teachers at Peking University put up a massive 
big-character poster at the soon-to-be famous university ‘triangle’ (sanjiaodi ???), a 
popular gathering place on the campus  (Figure 9). Although the text of the poster was 
prolix and dry, this informal document attacked both the university leadership and 
members of the municipal party committee that ran Beijing itself, a previously imperious, 
and impervious, group of high-level bureaucrats. Following Mao’s intervention the text of 
the poster was broadcast to the nation and then published in the press on 1 July, just as the 
capital’s media (press and radio) apparatuses were being taken over by supporters of 
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Mao’s own ideological line in what was known as the Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution. 
 
 
Figure 9: Peking University Poster, May 1966. Source: Long Bow Archive, Boston. 
 
Enraged by municipal and school leaders who had attempted to direct and dampen the 
movement to put ideological training at the forefront of education, the authors of the 
Peking University poster were particularly incensed by repeated admonishments from 
their local party leaders that the political situation did not warrant the use of posters or 
mass agitation. ‘Mini-posters’ (xiaozi bao ???) generated by group discussion and 
displayed discretely in classrooms or dormitory corridors were, however, deemed 
permissible. However, the broadcasting of the Peking University poster ordered by Mao 
sanctioned public criticisms of school authorities and inspired young people to write their 
own posters airing grievances about university governance, the direction of educational 
policy and even the fate of China’s revolution. 
 
The style of the 25 May Peking University poster was widely emulated. The authors 
employed a militant style of language popularized by the Communist Party in the war. 
They used it to provide their readers with pejorative quotations of their enemies; they 
posed rhetorical questions and offered their own answers; they enumerated a phrase-by-
phrase rejection and ridiculing of their enemies’ arguments—and it was all expressed in a 
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tone of urgency and moral outrage. The vitriolic language of the original poster and its 
imitators were matched by cartoons and caricatures of ideas, and eventually of party 
leaders, that came under attack, or who would fall from favour.  
 
At the time, the pro-Mao party media carried the following message about the new street-
side form of written protest: 
 
Big-character posters are a powerful weapon of these young fighters to attack those in authority who 
are openly or covertly taking the capitalist road, as well as all ghosts and monsters. Like sharp 
swords and daggers, these big-character posters pierce the enemy's vulnerable points, wound the 
enemy where it hurts, strengthen the resolve of revolutionaries and destroy the enemy's prestige. This 
is why they are warmly welcomed by the revolutionary masses, who hasten to copy them down and 
spread them. (Chinese Literature 1966: 42–43) 
 
The rise of the Red Guards 
The revolutionary agitation sanctioned by Mao was by no means restricted to university 
campuses. Over the spring and summer months of 1966, a small group of secondary 
school students at elite institutions in the university district of Beijing also gathered to 
discuss politics and the significance of the charged political atmosphere. Because of their 
family circumstances—among their number were the children of party leaders—some of 
them had access to classified government materials or were privy to the rumour-mill of 
gossip that circulated among high-level cadres. As vague cultural attacks on bourgeois 
thinking and political incorrectness became more focussed in the Shanghai media—as yet 
Beijing was only reprinting some of the cultural broadsides that Mao had his supporters 
publish in Shanghai—these young people felt emboldened to criticize their own school 
leaders and teachers. 
 
They believed that the dangerous bourgeois and anti-party sentiments being exposed in 
the media were also evident in their schools. They felt that their formerly respected school 
leaders were in fact part of a vast conspiracy within the party hell-bent on sidelining the 
revolution in favour of capitalist policies that would betray China’s socialist destiny. The 
criticisms they made of their high-school teachers and local party leaders took the form of 
mini-posters, short incendiary essays that were pasted on class or school noticeboards. 
During May 1966 the students at one particular institution, Tsinghua University Attached 
Middle School, debated the direction of China’s revolution among themselves; they 
decided that it was time to voice their concerns collectively. They chose for their ad hoc 
group a name that one of their fellows had been using to sign his mini-posters. That 
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student, Zhang Chengzhi, simply referred to himself as a ‘Red Guard’ (hong weishi ???, 
this was subsequently changed to hong weibing ???, since it was felt that the word ‘shi’ 
?, which also means ‘literary scholar,’ was tainted by its feudal associations). 
 
On 27 May, the classmates gathered at a favourite spot: the isolated ruins of the marble, 
Jesuit-designed Western Palaces of the Garden of Perfect Brightness. The gardens were a 
detached palace dating from the height of the Qing dynasty that had been laid waste 
following the invasion of the imperial capital by an Anglo-French force in 1860 during the 
troubled negotiations over the treaty that concluded the Second Opium War. The ruins, a 
major site of patriotic remembrance for modern Chinese, were situated next to the campus 
of Tsinghua Middle School. At that gathering, the group decided to call themselves ‘Mao 
Zedong’s Red Guards’ and they swore a collective oath to protect Mao Thought and fight 
for world revolution. Now they too would write big-wall posters. Their first poster, which 
was pasted up on 2 June, the day after the Peking University poster was broadcast on the 
radio, garnered over one hundred signatures of support. Thereafter, members of the 
nascent rebel group went on to write a number of critiques of their school, as well as of 
the party’s overall educational policies and ideological training. Three of these essays that 
carried the title ‘Long Live the Proletarian Revolutionary Spirit of Rebellion!’ 
(Wuchanjiejide geming zaofan jingshen wansui! ??????????????) would 
become famous. 
 
The rhetoric of rebellion 
Drafted by Luo Xiaohai the three essays that comprised ‘Long Live the Proletarian 
Revolutionary Spirit of Rebellion!’ were replete with the kind of militaristic hyperbole 
favoured by pro-Mao propagandists and writers—in particular Chen Boda and Yao 
Wenyuan, both of whom were increasingly influential in the Cultural Revolution 
movement. To this strain of denunciatory vitriol Luo added elements of playful (although 
deadly) metaphor by introducing the figure of the fictional hero Monkey King (Sun 
Houwang ???, also known as Sun Wukong ???) to the text. A favourite figure also 
with Mao Zedong—the chairman who recognized the unbridled side of his personality 
even compared himself to the irascible rascal Monkey—Sun Wukong was the wilfully 
rebellious but lovable rogue who featured in Wu Cheng’en’s sixteenth-century novel 
Journey to the West (Xiyou Ji ???). Monkey’s popularity only increased when a film 
version of a stage play about him defeating the ‘White-boned Demon’ was released in 
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1960 (Sun Wukong san da baigujing ????????). This was followed in 1964 by a 
cartoon feature film, Uproar in Heaven (Danao tiangong ????) (Figure 10). 
 
 
Figure 10: Poster for the 1964 feature film, Uproar in Heaven.  
Source: Long Bow Archive. 
 
Luo wrote in the final paragraph of the first of his three essays on justified rebellion 
against the status quo that: 
 
Revolutionaries are Monkey Kings, their golden rods are powerful, their supernatural powers far-
reaching and their magic omnipotent, for they possess Mao Zedong’s great invincible thought. We 
wield our golden rods, display our supernatural powers and use our magic to turn the old world 
upside down, smash it to pieces, pulverize it, create chaos and make a tremendous mess, the bigger 
the better! Today we must rebel against Tsinghua Middle School, rebel in the extreme, rebel to the 
end. We must create great revolutionary uproar in heaven and kill our way to a new proletarian 
world! 
 
????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????? ???????????????
???????????????????????????????????????  
 
Here Luo’s language took a cue from a poem written by Mao Zedong in reply to a verse 
by the pro-party littérateur Guo Moruo in 1961: 
 
A thunderstorm burst over the earth, 
So a devil rose from a heap of white bones. 
The deluded monk was not beyond the light, 
But the malignant demon must wreak havoc. 
The Golden Monkey wrathfully swung his massive cudgel, 
And the jade-like firmament was cleared of dust. 
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Today, a miasmal mist once more rising, 
We hail Sun Wukong, the wonder-worker. 
 
???????????????? 
???????????????? 
???????????????? 
???????????????? (Mao 1976: 41) 
 
Although he couched his meaning in the highly allusive language of classical Chinese 
poetry, in his verse Mao was referring to the ideological contestation between China and 
the Soviet Union in the years following the Soviet party leader Nikita Khrushchev’s 
denunciation of Stalin in 1956. The Sino-Soviet split of 1961 occurred when the two 
socialist giants fell out over issues related to ideological differences (Mao accused the 
Soviets of betraying Stalin, reneging on party principles and lurching towards 
‘revisionism’) and defence arrangements. That split fed into Mao’s fear that China would 
go the way of the Soviet Union and betray policies based on class struggle in favour of 
economic enrichment. These concerns directly influenced the Chairman’s decision to 
launch a ‘cultural revolution’ aimed at reviving the rebellious spirit of the nation and 
preventing it from backsliding. 
 
‘Bombard the headquarters!’ 
The Red Guards were able to pass a copy of two of the three parts of ‘Long Live the 
Proletarian Revolutionary Spirit of Rebellion!’ to Jiang Qing, Mao’s wife, at a public rally 
on 28 July 1966. By then the Chairman’s wife was playing an important intermediate role 
in fomenting the Cultural Revolution uprising. They did not have to wait long for a 
response. On 1 August 1966, Mao wrote a note of support for the newly formed Red 
Guards. Said to be a letter addressed to the Red Guards the document was circulated 
among members of the party leadership that was meeting in Beijing to discuss the 
unfolding political upheaval. Shortly thereafter, Mao’s ‘letter’—a text that was never 
formally sent to the Red Guards, its contents only ever having been read to them by a 
party leader—was broadcast on Central People’s Radio. Coming as it did at a time of such 
political drama Mao’s support for the small group of Red Guards at Tsinghua Middle 
School had a momentous impact. Within a short period Red Guard groups appeared in 
schools throughout China. They swore to pursue a radical ideological agenda that would 
see the fundamental structure of the party-state itself threatened. 
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At this crucial juncture in China’s modern political life the big-character poster, a medium 
that combined art and writing, image and text, politics and activism, would now coalesce 
into an ideological weapon with devastating effect. At a crucial meeting of central party 
leaders—the Eleventh Plenum of the Eighth Party Congress—convened in Beijing in 
early August shortly after Mao had declared his support for the Red Guards, the formal 
program for the unfolding political movement was being finalized. The meeting presaged 
what would become a vast purge of the Chairman’s real and imagined bureaucratic and 
ideological enemies. During that meeting Mao scribbled a few pencilled lines in the 
margins of the newspaper Beijing Daily published on 5 August. These notes were 
subsequently transcribed by one of his secretaries and emended, again in pencil, by the 
Chairman  (Figure 11). The resulting document was called ‘Bombard the Headquarters’ 
(Paoda silingbu ?????) and it carried the subtitle ‘my own big-character poster’ 
(wode yizhang dazibao ???????). A printed text of this ‘poster’ was circulated to 
party leaders attending the closed-door conference. 
 
 
Figure 11: Mao’s corrections to his secretary’s transcript of the text  
of ‘Bombard the Headquarters.’ Source: Long Bow Archive, Boston. 
 
In this extraordinary document Mao referred once more to the big-character poster that 
had appeared at Peking University on 25 May. He declared that: ‘China’s first Marxist-
Leninist big-character poster and Commentator’s article on it in People’s Daily are indeed 
superbly written!’ He went on to say: 
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Comrades, please read them again. But in the last fifty days or so some leading comrades from the 
central down to the local levels have acted in a diametrically opposite way. Adopting the reactionary 
stand of the bourgeoisie, they have enforced a bourgeois dictatorship and struck down the surging 
movement of the great Cultural Revolution of the proletariat. They have stood facts on their head and 
juggled black and white, encircled and suppressed revolutionaries, stifled opinions differing from 
their own, imposed a white terror, and felt very pleased with themselves. They have puffed up the 
arrogance of the bourgeoisie and deflated the morale of the proletariat. How poisonous! Viewed in 
connection with the Right deviation in 1962 and the wrong tendency of 1964, which was ‘Left’ in 
form but Right in essence, shouldn’t this make one wake up? 
 
????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????’?’??
???????????????????(Mao 1967) 
 
Here Mao spoke of ‘leading comrades’ having enforced a ‘bourgeois dictatorship’ on the 
city’s universities by clamping down on calls for a further ideological revolution in 
education. Mao thus created a series of stark binary opposites after which he proceeded to 
employ historical analogy that he capped off with a pointed, somewhat sardonic, dismissal 
of his opponents. He said of those who had attempted to quell the student rebellion in the 
universities: ‘They have stood facts on their head and juggled black and white, encircled 
and suppressed revolutionaries, stifled opinions differing from their own, imposed a white 
terror, and felt very pleased with themselves.’ He used imagery that invoked the period of 
the 1920s and 1930s when, following the split between the Nationalist and Communists, a 
‘white terror’ launched by the Nationalists saw the detention and execution of numerous 
revolutionaries. 
 
Composed in a tone that commingled intimacy with admonition, Mao Zedong’s ‘big-
character poster’ appears to be a letter of support for the students of Peking University, 
and the Red Guards whom they had inspired. In reality, the ‘poster’ was an internally 
circulated declaration of war on a shadowy clique that Mao assumed lurked at the heart of 
the Communist Party, one that he felt was threatening the very course of the Chinese 
revolution. 
 
Painting the world red 
The text of Mao’s ‘poster,’ as well as the ‘image’ associated with the text achieved an 
iconic status overnight. Since big-character posters—an agitprop art form that had been 
turned into a powerful political tool for non-official communication—had achieved a new 
prominence in the proceeding months, people readily imagined that a text issued by the 
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ultimate revolutionary authority in the country dubbed a big-character poster must have 
actually been written with a calligraphic brush on paper and pasted up on a wall  (Figure 
12). And although the mass dissemination of the text played a strategic role in placing 
Mao on the side of rebellious students and teachers who had been putting up posters on 
campuses in the capital from May that year (and often suffering from punishments meted 
out by strict party leaders in their schools and the work teams sent to direct the unfolding 
revolution in education that initially was at the heart of the Cultural Revolution), in reality 
unlike those posters Mao’s phantom poster was not written with a brush dipped in ink; it 
was never posted on the walls of the party compound of Zhongnan Hai, as many had 
assumed; nor indeed was it ever made into a real poster. Nevertheless, ‘Bombard the 
Headquarters’ remains the quintessential Ur-big-character poster of the Cultural 
Revolution era. After the text of the ‘poster’ was broadcast and carried in papers 
throughout the country, art works (themselves predominantly posters) quickly appeared 
that showed Mao in a military uniform, writing-brush in hand, penning the now-famous 
‘big-character poster’ in red ink (Figure 13). 
 
 
Figure 12: Poster of Mao and ‘Bombard the Headquarters’ c. 1967.  
Source: Long Bow Archive, Boston. 
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Figure 13: Poster of Mao and ‘Bombard the Headquarters’ c. 1967.  
Source: Long Bow Archive, Boston. 
 
Mao’s poster was powerful for a number of reasons. Named as a ‘big-character poster’ it 
drew on the authority of the unofficial and rebellious. Written by the hand of the 
revolutionary demiurge it feed off the unofficial status of the medium while validating the 
role of the rebellious leader. It also employed a colourful political rhetoric that combined 
a modern political lexicon with historical allusion and semi-classical Chinese syntax, all 
of which were couched in a tone of high dudgeon. Apart from the image of the poster 
itself, this landscape of imagery—one that featured reds, blacks and whites, one of 
vituperation and metaphorical dangers and ill-concealed threat—continues to enjoy a 
purchase on Chinese media, politics and art to this day (Barmé 2012a). 
 
A crucial element in the prose of Mao’s poster is that he see-sawed between the resolutely 
martial spirit of the dominant revolutionary standing on the side of historical inevitability 
and the claims of a resistant underdog who was supposedly engaged in a struggle of 
resistance against an unyielding bureaucracy. In this ‘poster,’ the author portrays himself 
and those he supports as victims, outsiders who enjoy a purity of purpose and who are 
struggling to have their voices heard. Yet in a document initially written for and circulated 
among party leaders at a crucial moment in the country’s political history, ‘Bombard the 
Headquarters’ contained powerful declamations that, through their very magisterial nature, 
would brook no rebuke; nor indeed did they require a defence or, for that matter, would 
they countenance a response (Figure 14). 
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Figure 14: Text of ‘Bombard the Headquarters’ in a Red Guard publication, 1966.  
Source: Long Bow Archive, Boston. 
 
 
Figure 15: Red Guards and revolutionary rebels putting up posters in Beijing, 1966.  
Source: Long Bow Archive, Boston. 
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Figure 16: A poster-festooned statue of Confucius, ‘the number one bad egg.’  
Source: Long Bow Archive, Boston. 
 
Mao Zedong’s affirmation of the Peking University big-character poster, followed by his 
approval of the Red Guards and the publication of ‘Bombard the Headquarters’ in August 
1966, led to the big-character poster becoming one of the key tools in the further 
radicalization of Chinese society and political discourse (Figure 15). Posters soon covered 
walls not only in schools and on university campuses, but also in government offices, 
factories, along streets, places of worship and throughout the countryside (Figure 16). 
From mid 1966 until late 1967, the big-character poster was a ubiquitous form of political 
expression, one that combined wall art with the written word and deadly political purpose 
(Figure 17). 
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Figure 17: Big-character poster denunciations in an office, 1967.  
Source: Long Bow Archive, Boston. 
 
The future tragedy of Democracy Wall 
When the radical agenda of the Cultural Revolution years was eventually called into 
question, again the big-character poster was employed to do so. The most famous 
instance of written public opposition to Mao dates from 1974 when a sprawling, multi-
panel poster appeared on the streets of the southern city of Guangzhou. Known as the 
‘Li-Yi-Zhe Big-character Poster’ (Li Yizhe dazibao ??????), it called for an end to 
party authoritarianism and appealed for ‘socialist democracy and the rule of law.’ Other 
petitions to the government and protests against party rule appeared in the fading years 
of the Cultural Revolution, but the Li-Yi-Zhe poster stands out for its unstinting support 
for big-character posters as a form of democratic expression (the poster was the work of 
LI Zhengtian from the Guangzhou Art Academy, Chen YIyang, a high-school student 
and Wang XiZHE, a worker; they signed their joint work with the composite name Li 
Yizhe). 
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Smaller posters featuring poems written in mourning for the deceased Premier Zhou Enlai 
featured fleetingly in early April 1976, when people gathered in Tiananmen Square in his 
memory and in protest. Again, posters were central to the popular outcry against party rule 
and dictatorship during the protests of 1978–1979 when a street-side wall at Xidan on 
Chang’an Boulevard in central Beijing became for a time the national forum for political 
dissent in China. The most famous of the posters pasted on what would be known as the 
‘Xidan Democracy Wall’ (Xidan minzhu qiang ?????) was written by a young 
electrician by the name of Wei Jingsheng. In it Wei called for a ‘fifth modernization’ to be 
added to China’s program to transform itself: democracy. 
 
Wei’s appeal for fundamental political change in China was, however, only one of the 
many manifestos and statements that appeared during the short-lived Democracy Wall 
period. Others imagined a very different, and less than democratic, future for China. As 
from late 1978, when the country entered a period of prolonged market-oriented economic 
reform and trade openness, there were those who saw change as merely an interregnum in 
harsh party rule. 
 
In May 1979, a haunting story published under the penname Su Ming, entitled ‘A Possible 
Tragedy in the Year 2000’ (Keneng fasheng zai 2000 niande beiju?????2000????), 
appeared in the samizdat journal Peking Spring as well as on the wall at Xidan. The story 
was set twenty years into the future, in the last year of the old and the first year of the new 
century. Following the death of a number of senior political leaders in suspicious 
circumstances, the members of the Gang of Four (having been purged in 1976 and blamed 
for the violent excesses of the Cultural Revolution period) are suddenly rehabilitated. 
‘Another political upheaval has convulsed China,’ writes Su Ming in his prophetic fiction. 
‘A bold supposition, perhaps, but if you look at the history of China and the weakness of 
her political institutions, not so totally improbable.’ The story then offers a timeline: 
 
December 26 [1999]: Celebrations of the 106th anniversary of the birth of Chairman Mao reach their 
climax. The People’s Daily runs a front-page headline that reads: ‘Our Great Teacher Chairman Mao 
is the Never-setting, Red, Red Sun in the Hearts of the People of the Entire World’ …  
 
October 1: The fifty-first anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic is celebrated in grand 
style. The new leadership of Party Central mounts the rostrum at Tiananmen to review the parade of 
five million. The new leader delivers the following speech: 
 
We must be resolute and ruthless in our efforts to exterminate the capitalists within the party; 
we must prevent a reoccurrence of the tragedy that took place twenty-two years ago [with the 
initiation of market-oriented reforms]; 
We must carry through the present reforms and re-establish centralized party leadership; 
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We must wipe out the corrupt bourgeois Western influences that prevail in all spheres of 
ideology; the proletariat must occupy all fronts; 
We must freeze wages and stress ideological revolution; we must limit or eliminate altogether 
bourgeois legal rights, and destroy the existing polarization of poverty and wealth. 
We must get rid of foreign capital; we must impose strict controls on relations with foreign 
countries and conduct a revolutionary diplomatic policy based on self-reliance; 
We must strengthen the public security system and enforce the dictatorship of the proletariat 
rigorously, in order to limit the activities of the bourgeoisie in every sphere. (Su Ming 1979: 
137–148) 
 
In speculative retrospect, such a refrain will be eerily familiar to readers of Utopia, the 
Maoist fundamentalist Internet site that flourished from 2002 up to the downfall of 
Chongqing Party Secretary Bo Xilai in March 2012 (Hunwick 2012). The tenor of this 
speech concocted by Su Ming in 1979 also adumbrates the hardline sentiments of the 
ficitional party leader featured in the 2008 novel The Fat Years (??????2013?) by 
the Beijing-based Hong Kong author Chan Kuan-choong (Jaivin 2010).  
 
Character assassination 
Of course, the counter-revolution that Su Ming had spoken of never occurred, at least not 
in the way that he had imagined. Chinese reality has outwitted even the canniest 
prognosticators: the country has maintained a one-party state as well as the Mao-era 
panoply of revolutionary language and symbolism while pursuing a radical form of party-
guided neo-liberal market reform.  
 
Big-character posters appeared fleetingly ten years after the Democracy Wall when 
rebellious students in Beijing called on their fellows to march on Tiananmen Square in 
1989 to protest against the party following the former Party General Secretary Hu 
Yaobang’s death in mid-April that year. But the poster as a political instrument and form 
of populist democracy had all but been eliminated following the closing down of the 
Xidan Democracy Wall in 1979. Indeed, big-character posters were formally banned by 
the Chinese government in September 1980 on the grounds that history had proven they 
were unable to contribute positively to the growth of ‘popular democratic rights in China.’ 
 
During the decade from 1979 until 4 June 1989, art as much as internal party contestation 
and academic polemics was the arena in which some of the most powerful protean 
energies harboured through the Cultural Revolution years were to find expression. In 
particular, artists engaged with the written Chinese character, the Hanzi ??, to 
investigate the residual power of text and image. Using a form of orthography that 
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contained strong visual and symbolic elements, they turned the written word, the text 
itself, into the basis for their artistic experimentation. They attempted thereby both to 
lambast and to challenge the world of words, the plethora of propaganda and the empire of 
signs that had bedevilled so many writers and thinkers in China’s twentieth century. 
Artists turned the written and printed word into a palette for their own cultural re-
creations. They did so through an interrogation of and assault on the Chinese character 
itself. 
 
 
Figure 18: A page from Xu Bing’s ‘Book from the Sky.’ Source: Gao Minglu (2008) ’85 Meishu 
Yundong—80 niandaide renwen qianwei, Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, Guilin, vol. 1. 
 
Many of these efforts and investigations into the written, the spoken and the visual 
focussed on the ideas of wei ? (the false, non-legitimate, fake, imitation, corrupt, made-
up, invented) as opposed to zhen ? (the true, correct, accurate, appropriate, real). In the 
1980s, some artists pursued their investigation through meticulous artisanship, as was the 
case in Beijing of Xu Bing, famous for creating with a group of wood-block carvers his 
‘Book from the Sky’ (Tianshu ??) (Figure 18, above).  
 
Others pursued the subject in Hangzhou, one of the alternate centres of artistic production 
near Shanghai. A prominent early figure in this latter group was Gu Wenda whose work 
‘Displacement’ (Cuowei ??) and his continued assault on Chinese characters garnered 
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him early fame (Figure 19). Then there were such non-academy trained creators as 
Manchu-Chinese Guan Wei, whose work has been familiar to Australian audiences since 
the early 1990s. As early as the mid-1980s, Guan used his art to tussle with the nonsense 
of Chinese literary clichés in the context of acupuncture and anomie (Guan Wei 1988: 
387ff) (Figure 20). 
 
 
Figure 19: ‘Displacement,’ Gu Wenda. Source: Gao Minglu (2008) ’85 Meishu Yundong—80 niandaide 
renwen qianwei, Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, Guilin, vol. 1. 
 
 
Figure 20: ‘Zhi Hu Zhe Ye,’ Guan Wei. Source: Gao Minglu (2008) ’85 Meishu Yundong—80 niandaide 
renwen qianwei, Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, Guilin, vol. 1. 
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Another artist in the milieu of Gu Wenda was Wu Shanzhuan, mentioned at the beginning 
of this paper (Wu 2008: 6–7). Originally from Zhoushan near Shanghai he too was trained 
in Hangzhou. This was a period in which groups of artists and poets flourished in the 
People’s Republic and they collectively began challenging and changing the face of 
contemporary Chinese art and culture through grandiose manifestos, sententious samizdat 
publications, performance pieces and guerrilla exhibitions. After graduating from art 
school he returned to Zhoushan where, with a number of fellow graduates, he established 
an artistic collective called ‘Red Humor’ at the local Zuyin Temple in February 1986. 
 
The ‘Red Humor’ group claimed their works gave expression to ‘serious absurdity’ 
(yansude huangdan ?????). In particular, they were obsessed with the written 
Chinese character—something they took as being a concrete embodiment of the artistic, 
the cultural and the ideological. Their first exhibition was titled ‘Red 70% Black 25% 
White 5%’; among other things it featured the word ‘nirvana’ (niepan ??) that was 
placed over a pile of symbols that spelled out ‘garbage’ (laji ??). Through their use of 
oversized, distorted and higgledy-piggledy characters the artists employed what they 
called ‘red humor’ to question the faded red of China’s revolution and the deficit of 
meaning in they found in the often-ludicrous party-state propaganda of their day.  
 
Theirs was an artistic observation on the state of contemporary culture as well as an 
attempt to adjudicate over the past. For his part, Wu Shanzhuan also made a series of red 
seals, of the kind used instead of a signature and for notarizing documents. He declared 
that the oversized seals were represented the imprimatur of his group, the ‘In the Red 
Revolutionary Committee’ (Gao 2008, 1: 224–35). 
 
In 1987, Wu created an installation called ‘In the Red’ (Chizi ??) (Osnos 2009). It 
featured a room covered in the graffiti-like remnants of big-character posters, as well as 
randomly written signs and lines made up by himself and others. In this work Wu 
attempted to manufacture in a reduced form the stifling environment of the written 
logorrhoea of the past; it was an ironic attempt to recapture the overwhelming and manic 
mood engendered by the red sea of big-character posters that swelled up from mid 1966, 
which we have discussed in the above (Figure 21). 
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Figure 21: Wu Shanzhuan and ‘Red Humor.’ Source: Gao Minglu (2008) ’85 Meishu Yundong—80 
niandaide renwen qianwei, Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, Guilin, vol. 1. 
 
As an ironic reprise of big-character poster culture, ‘Red Humor’ and ‘In the Red’ were a 
shorthand reprise of the big-character posters that played a crucial role in the culture and 
politics of the Cultural Revolution era. In the bapo Eight-fragments style of these 
installations, a simple quotation of verbal extremism and abuse, Wu Shanzhuan offered a 
momentary reflection on the word, the wall and the maelstrom of the revolutionary excess, 
as well as the verbal outpourings of the period. In surrounding the viewer with disjointed 
quotations from the written cacophony of the character poster, Wu left the viewer with a 
sense of form while evacuating all actual content from what had been during the Maoist 
decades from the 1950s until 1980 a potent element of public politics (Figure 22). In his  
 
 
Figure 22: A Shanghai office during the Cultural Revolution. Source: Long Bow Archive, Boston. 
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work, Wu reduced what was a complex and unique medium, one that allowed for the 
articulation of vastly different views and rhetorical effects, to little more than cultural 
wallpaper. Inadvertently, Wu’s comic take on the big-character poster tells us little about 
the past, but a great deal about the future of China’s red culture. Herein tragedy was 
repeated first as farce, but then again as product. 
 
Grass-mud horses 
The events of 1989, a year during which a mass protest movement from April to June 
would be repressed by military force in Beijing and other Chinese cities, led to a period in 
which artistic endeavour returned to the margins and the underground. Following the 
suppression of 4 June, cultural endeavours took new directions, both underground, as an 
alternative to the state over-culture, and in the complicity of some artists with the 
Communist Party’s market socialism (Barmé 1999). The artistic tussle with the Chinese 
written character and the word, however, continued. New waves of economic 
liberalization unleashed after 1992 as a result of the party leader Deng Xiaoping’s 
declaration that development was China’s only way to a prosperous the future had a 
profound impact on the urban landscape. Vast building projects in cities throughout the 
country saw old structures demolished and traditional neighbourhoods flattened. Walls 
and buildings now sported not posters of protest, but the ubiquitous word ‘demolish’ (chai 
?). So constant was the frenzy for demolition and reconstruction that eventually one wag 
created a composite character ‘chai-na’ ???, which combined the word ‘demolish’ with 
the syllable na (Figure 23). ‘China’ was now the place where ‘things are being torn down’ 
(chai ne ??). 
 
Figure 23: The composite character ‘chai-na’ ???. 
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Online comics also took pleasure in creating playful new Chinese characters. Another 
combination character was ‘diang’, which melded the three words dang ? + zhong ? + 
yang ?, or ‘Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party’ (Figure 24). But the war 
of words was not limited to orthographic inventions. The resistance to the constant 
outpourings of party propaganda, a veritable red logorrhoea, was often far more pointed.  
 
 
Figure 24: ‘Diang’: dang ? + zhong ? + yang ?,  
or ‘Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.’ 
 
In 2009, an Internet meme appeared in the form of the Grass-mud Horse (Caonima ??
?) (Figure 25). Featured in a comic video the ‘horse’ bore a name that was a play on the 
words cào nǐ mā ???, literally ‘fuck your mother.’ It was a foul-mouthed attack on the 
tireless efforts of the country’s Internet police to censor unacceptable posts on the web. 
The use of a version of what, since the Republican era (1912–1949), has been dubbed 
‘China’s national swearword’ (guoma ??), was a pointed attack on the party-state itself. 
 
 
Figure 25: The composite character Grass-mud Horse (Caonima ???). 
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The Grass-mud Horse—a creature with the appearance of an Alpaca—was said to roam 
the Mahler Gobi Desert (malege bi ????—that is, ‘curse your mother’s cunt’) and its 
existence was supposed to be endangered by ravenous River Crabs (hexie ??), creatures 
whose name is a pun on the word ‘harmonize’ (hexie ??), a term that in Chinese Internet 
parlance means to censor or delete unacceptable online content. Both horses and crabs 
were said to compete for the precious fodder known as wo cao ?? (fuck me!). 
 
 
Figure 26A: Ai Weiwei as a door god. Source: Ai Weiwei Studio. 
 
That same year the dissenting artist and blogger Ai Weiwei offered his view of the 
significance of the Grass-mud Horse: 
Barmé               History Writ Large 
 
 
PORTAL, vol. 9, no. 3, November 2012.  33 
Sixty years have passed and we still haven’t seen a vote, there is no universal education, no health 
insurance, no free press, no freedom of speech, no freedom of information, no freedom to relocate, 
no independent judiciary, there are no public watchdogs, no independent labor unions, no national 
army, no constitutional protections, and all that’s left is a Grass Mud Horse. (Lee 2011: 232–33) 
 
Following a period of detention in 2011 on charges of tax evasion, Ai soon reappeared on 
the Beijing arts scene subdued but not cowed. Shortly thereafter, he celebrated the 
indomitable spirit of the Grass-mud Horse in a series of works in the style of Chinese New 
Year prints (Barmé 2012b) (Figures 26A & 26B). In the 2012 documentary film about Ai, 
Never Sorry, the curse word, and various permutations of it, once more features 
 
 
Figure 26B: Ai Weiwei as a door god. Source: Ai Weiwei Studio. 
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prominently, as well as being the theme of a ditty that Ai sings to his iPad during the 
film’s closing sequence (Klayman 2012). 
 
This essay has argued that the tussle with the written word has been a feature of artistic 
endeavour, creation, deconstruction and contestation since the late-Qing era in the 
nineteenth century. Throughout the twentieth and into the twenty-first centuries many 
artists, writers and thinkers have grappled with the allure and power of the ‘box-shaped 
character’ (fangkuaizi ???). They have regarded it as crystallising and expressing the 
contradictory legacies and burdens of tradition. Manipulation of the character continues in 
official and non-official cultural pursuits and, in some cases, it explodes its bindings in a 
shower of expletives, as in the case of the foul-mouthed and artful wordsmith Ai Weiwei. 
In these simple slogans of disgust, contempt and rejection the word-wars of the past are 
summed up with crude simplicity. In three Chinese words the loathing for politics, the 
market and marketable protest finds its most succinct expression. A large history is, with 
this succinct malediction, writ small. 
 
*     *     * 
 
In concluding her comments on The Mad Box exhibition at the Art Gallery of New South 
Wales, with which I began this essay, Elizabeth Farrelly made the following observation 
about the vacuity of contemporary artistic pursuit: 
 
This is no longer art as satire, social indictment or revelation. It’s a smokescreen for a self-serving, 
intellectually vacant and morally abdicant curatariat. 
 
It’s not that we don’t have issues. Imagine what Beckmann and Dix could do with Europe self-
immolating over money and race. With bank bailouts as houses and jobs go down the toilet. With 
children overboard. 
 
Now, as Roth noted in 1933, ‘the European mind is capitulating … out of weakness … sloth … 
apathy … lack of imagination.’ We, however, preferring an optimism blinder than any of Dix’s war-
wounded, daren’t look. So our art no longer serves truth but bullshit. 
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